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This essay explores how the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009 has affected the
stability of what Stephen Gill has termed the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary
neo-liberalism’,1 more precisely, in the realm of international tax policy. Rather
than providing an in-depth and complete empirical study of the matter, this essay
will highlight certain interesting developments and touch upon a series of possibly
relevant questions that could form the basis for a future research agenda. In the
ﬁrst section, we will examine the remarkable strength and resilience of the new
constitutionalism as the institutional component of neo-liberal hegemony. Then we
will proceed to an exploration of the impact of the crisis on this hegemony, also
paying attention to deepening geopolitical multipolarity as an additional variable.
The ﬁnal, more empirical section will investigate the case of international taxation
in this context, and demonstrate that new constitutionalism remains a crucial
supporting pillar of neo-liberal globalisation.
New constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism as a
‘Gestalt of scales’
Stephen Gill deﬁnes new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism as the
political project aimed at anchoring neo-liberal policies of privatisation, liber-
alisation and pro-market regulation, as well as monetarist objectives, into
national and international legal frameworks, insulating these policies from nor-
mal, day-to-day democratic debate and decision-making. Analogous to national
constitutions, these frameworks can only be modiﬁed in extraordinary political
circumstances and through burdensome procedures, often requiring special
majorities or unanimity. At the national level, one can think of legal provisions
*The text was ﬁnalized in December 2009.
concerning the political independence of the central bank. Examples of new
constitutional arrangements at the international level are the regime of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO); the Western-biased and relatively undemocratic
governance structures of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank, which make it easier for these institutions to apply neo-liberal con-
ditionality; the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements of the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European internal
market and economic and monetary union, where very concrete neo-liberal
norms are anchored in the treaty; the statutes of the European Central Bank
(ECB); and the plethora of regional and bilateral free trade agreements, which
often include provisions that go beyond the WTO acquis in a neo-liberal sense.
As such, new constitutionalism legally encodes the regulatory dimension of neo-
liberal globalisation, in particular with regard to free movement of products and
production factors and property rights (Ref. 1, pp. 138–142).
Having said that, it is useful to see the concept of new constitutionalism, being
the legal anchoring of neo-liberal globalisation, in relation to the latter’s economic
anchoring. Both are narrowly intertwined. For individual states and even groups of
states it has become extremely difﬁcult to withdraw from certain international legal
arrangements, because the underlying economic interconnectivity between coun-
tries is no longer escapable. For their long-term prosperity, states need, for
example, the presence of transnational corporations on their soils, since the latter
possess unique assets (capital, technology, know-how, access to valuable networks
for sourcing and distribution, marketing information, and so on), to which purely
national ﬁrms in many cases no longer have access. In their turn, transnational
corporations want host states to conduct policies that promote globalisation.
Investment regimes should be open, with little regulation that could hamper the
companies’ free operation and decision-making. By the same token, transnational
corporations insist on at-the-border trade openness for their intermediary products
and exports, as well as ﬁnancial openness (i.e., no capital controls or ﬁnancial
transaction taxes) for their lending, investment, proﬁt shifting, hedging and other
ﬁnancial operations. In this context, ofﬁcially embracing new constitutionalism is a
signal to the markets that the country is willing to provide an attractive investment
climate on a permanent basis. Financial and economic at-the-border openness, and
being a member to certain international pro-market frameworks, have become
competitive assets in their own right, in addition to domestic neo-liberal policies
(such as lower taxes and ﬂexible labour markets), generating a transition of the era
of the (Keynesian) welfare state to that of the competition state.2 What is more,
neo-liberal constitutionalist frameworks are a part of a wider set of international
regimes that help states to manage globalisation as a ‘thicker’ form of complex
interdependence. Defecting from neo-liberal frameworks could cause unpredictability,
retaliation and reputation damage in other regimes.3,4 In the same vein, new
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constitutionalism strongly discourages temporary and sectoral amendments or
opt-outs by rendering them ‘illegal’, even in cases where governments in the
absence of a legal framework would deem the beneﬁts of such a derogation larger
than the costs. It also prevents groups of states from gradually eroding the overall
framework of neo-liberal globalisation in a more collective way.
It is equally interesting to appreciate the political-geographical dimension of new
constitutionalism. It legally anchors the free movement of capital, goods and services
as one of the main drivers of neo-liberal globalisation, in order to secure a relatively
open international market space. In the meantime, however, policies of market
correction (social, environmental, taxation) most of the time still reside at the
national level. In this way, new constitutionalism more or less freezes a political-
geographical mismatch between market promotion and market correction, or – as
political geographers studying ‘politics of scale’ would put it – codiﬁes a certain
‘Gestalt of scales’,5 a speciﬁc conﬁguration of different political scales at which
respective economic, social and political activities are located. In this case, invest-
ment and trade enjoy a huge (potential of) mobility on a vast scale (e.g., EU-wide,
global), enabling transnational corporations to play off one against another political-
regulatory jurisdictions at lower scales by engaging in ‘regime shopping’ or
‘regulatory arbitrage’. This phenomenon demonstrates that organisation of human
activity at certain political-geographical scales is far from a power-neutral process.
This unique new constitutionalist Gestalt of scales forms the institutional
component of neo-liberal hegemony. Lending some concepts from neo-Gramscian
International Political Economy, one can understand neo-liberal globalisation as the
product of a ‘hegemonic bloc’ directed by a transnational capitalist class (interna-
tional ﬁnance and transnational corporations) and undergirded by material, idea-
tional and institutional components. In the material realm, we see the predominance
of transnational capital, assisted by the governments of the advanced industrialised
and emerging countries, as well as by their potential mobility and concomitant ‘exit
option’, which disciplines governments, parliaments and national trade unions. In
this respect, new constitutionalism and its focus on ﬁnancial and trade openness
have increased the structural power of transnational capital, inducing national
governments to embrace neo-liberal-oriented policy regimes in order to thwart off
potential investment strikes and/or capital ﬂight.6 In the ideational sphere, militant
neo-liberalism has been succeeded by the seemingly more politically ‘neutral’
globalisation discourse, which pretends that states have lost a considerable deal
of their actual sovereignty and that for nations there is no alternative to adjusting to
the exigencies of internationally mobile investors. It is through the globalisation
discourse that neo-liberalism has succeeded in colonising Christian- and social-
democracy as well, of which Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ and Gerhard Schro¨der’s
‘Neue Mitte’ are well-known articulations. This compact of material forces and
ideas is supported by a plethora of institutional mechanisms at the national and
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international scale, ranging from bilateral trade and investment agreements over
global arrangements, such as the multilateral trade regime, to powerful and inﬂu-
ential institutions, such as the G7, WTO and IMF, which advocate, design, push and
police neo-liberal globalisation policies, while keeping market-corrective regulation
at lower levels. In this way, the three components that make up the hegemonic bloc –
a ruling class with a certain world view and speciﬁc relations with other groups – are
mutually reinforcing. In particular, the new constitutionalist institutional architecture,
itself the product of transnational capitalist interests and neo-liberal ideas, that had
broken through in the 1980s, both serves certain material interests and feeds a
disempowering globalisation discourse as the more ‘neutral’ accomplice of neo-liberal
ideology.
The impact of the crisis
One could argue that the neo-liberal hegemony can only be undone by funda-
mental changes in one or more of the three supporting pillars. Provided that an
institutional constellation is, to a large extent, the product of material and idea-
tional forces, one has to wait for changes in the latter two in order to get overall
transformation of the hegemonic bloc or its replacement. The problem now is
that new constitutionalism as the institutional pillar of neo-liberal hegemony has
adopted a life on its own, contributing to the stability and resilience of the
process of neo-liberal globalisation in an exceptional way. Legal and economic
anchoring makes it for individual states almost impossible to de-link from neo-
liberal globalisation, even when transformations in domestic social relations and
hegemonic ideology tend in that direction. Only great powers, or blocs like the
European Union (provided that it can ﬁnd internal consensus), might consider
such a move, boasting, among other things, upon their market power. But even
for them, re-introducing huge trade barriers or strict capital controls could provoke
particularly harmful reactions from the markets. In some instances, however, the
disciplining globalisation discourse and its focus on international competitiveness
are instrumental in exaggerating the conﬁnes of the ‘politically possible’, thus
overlooking opportunities for change.7,8 A case in point are the technical possibi-
lities to successfully implement a Tobin tax at the national or Euro-zone level, even
without the participation of other major ﬁnancial centres.9
All this means that neo-liberal globalisation can persist for a very long time,
even if in several parts of the world dominant material and ideational forces have
already rejected neo-liberalism, so that the latter is no longer ‘hegemonic’ in the
Gramscian sense (i.e. based on consent) but has grown ‘coercive’. In these cases
‘supremacy’ has replaced ‘hegemony’ (Ref. 1, pp. 142–149). It follows that
fundamental change towards a different order can only be brought about by a
broad, intercontinental shift in the material (i.e. social forces gaining power over
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others) and/or ideational sphere. A severe global crisis is typically a kind of event
that can undermine the ideational pillar of a certain hegemony, by empowering
oppositional groups and detaching certain social groups from the ruling ones.
After all, these were the conditions under which neo-liberalism could take over in
the wake of the economic crisis of the 1970s. Now the question is whether the
2008–2009 global ﬁnancial meltdown could have a similar effect.
Without any doubt, the crisis has delivered a blow to the legitimacy of neo-liberal
ideas. Yet, this does not imply that the whole neo-liberal legacy will be swept away
altogether. The criticism mostly targets the insufﬁcient regulation and supervision
of the ﬁnancial sector (including offshore ﬁnancial centres or tax havens) and
the ‘greed’ many players in that sector have allegedly displayed. Accordingly, the
ﬁnancial reform agenda is mainly focused on technical regulatory issues such as
capital adequacy measures and accounting rules, while bringing hedge funds,
bonuses, and tax havens into the scope of (non-stringent) global regulation. As such,
the reform agenda ‘did not go much beyond the pre-existing international initiatives
that had recently been developed in more technocratic international bodies’ (Ref. 10,
p. 275). Consequently, key characteristics of neo-liberal globalisation – free trade
and capital mobility – stay out of the current controversy. It is true that the Doha
round of the WTO is stuck in the morass, but this was already the case before the
crisis. Importantly, the crisis has not engendered calls to roll back the existing neo-
liberal attainments of the WTO. To the contrary, the leaders’ summit of the G20 has
spoken out in favour of a successful completion of the Doha Round.11 Even more
striking is the fact that the crisis has hardly sparked any debate about ﬁnancial
globalisation as such and the free movement of capital.12 In the perception of the
elites and the public, the causes of the crisis are largely situated at the domestic level
(in the US and elsewhere), while (neo-liberal) globalisation as such is not to blame.
In the material realm, some particular interests have incurred damage. Govern-
ments, somewhat more than before, acting on behalf of other social groups (including
the ordinary tax payers), seem to have regained the self-conﬁdence to keep the
bankers in check. As Thirkell-White has pointed out, public anger over the credit
crisis and large-scale protests have increased the politicisation of the global ﬁnancial
reform process to a considerable degree, ‘triggering the rise of a populist politics
seeking punishment for the banking sector’ (Ref. 13, p. 689). Politicians are searching
for measures that will force the ﬁnancial sector (and possibly the speculators) to
pay, for instance by curbing and/or taxing excessive remuneration of cadres and
traders. But at the same time, capitalist and labour interests of the ﬁnancial sector
in New York, London and other ﬁnancial centres still exert strong inﬂuence over
the policies of their respective governments. Even more importantly, transna-
tional corporations – vehement defenders of an open economic and ﬁnancial
world order – are still at the core of today’s global productive system and will not
easily support fundamental deviation from neo-liberal globalisation.
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Given the limited anti-liberal critique at the ideational level, no powerful global
movement has emerged urging for a fundamental transformation of the institutional
component of neo-liberal hegemony. Free trade and free movement of capital
remain the norm, and the current levels of international liberalisation are not turned
back fundamentally. In this way, globalisation can continue to discipline national
governments, and so can new constitutionalism to disempower counter-hegemonic
social forces and ideas. There is another feature of the institutional component of
neo-liberal hegemony that now proves functional in sustaining the hegemony:
the relative insulation of the ﬁnancial regulatory establishment from the rest
of politics and society. While at the domestic level the crisis has increased the
politicisation of ﬁnancial policy-making, at the international level the ﬁnancial
reform process continues to be governed by a transnational network of ﬁnance
ministries, central banks and a plethora of highly technocratic ﬁnancial regulatory
bodies. Actors within this transnational policy community traditionally hold on to a
neo-liberal policy paradigm, while their conservative world views are reinforced
by the highly technical nature of their expertise – impeding participation from other
stake-holders – and the active involvement of the private sector in the global
ﬁnancial governance process. Although the ﬁnancial private and public establish-
ment is now under ﬁre, it still monopolises almost all relevant expertise, and is
needed to design and implement solutions. Therefore, bringing other social interests
to the table of ﬁnancial decision-making is key to counter-hegemonic action.14–16
Let us conclude this section with a reﬂection on the deepening of multipolarity
in relation to the issue at hand. The emergence of China, India, Brazil, Russia
(i.e., the so-called BRICs) and other newly industrialising countries could have
brought different material interests at the centre of international ﬁnancial and
economic decision-making. However, there are plenty of indications that the
counter-hegemonic potential of these countries should not be overstated. These
countries also possess a mix of offensive, internationalist and rather defensive,
protectionist capitalist interests, just like the West, with governments more often
than not promoting the former. Since 2001 China is a committed member of the
WTO, which has also caused severe economic shocks and restructuring to the
detriment of defensive interests in China itself.17 The IBSA countries (India,
Brazil, South Africa) have increasingly subscribed to the norms of neo-liberal
globalisation.18 Part of their stubbornness in the current Doha Round of the WTO –
through the G20 of southern powers, which are mostly agricultural exporters –
relates to their tough demands on agricultural liberalisation in the North as a
precondition to discuss more openness on industrial goods and services in their own
countries. The ﬁnal result of such a bargain could be an intensiﬁcation of neo-liberal
globalisation rather than the opposite. The recent summits of the G20 for ﬁnancial
matters in Washington, London and Pittsburgh (2008–2009) did by no means serve
as the sites for a great clash between a neo-liberal West and a counter-hegemonic
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south. Admittedly, the emerging economies insist upon a bigger say in institutions
like the UN Security Council, IMF and World Bank, but the adaptation of these
institutions (for which momentum is growing), including the launch of the per-
manent G20 summit, does not imply the end of neo-liberal globalisation. It is true
that certain emerging economies, such as China and Russia, still run a more state-
interventionist capitalism at home and operate on world markets through state-led
energy companies and sovereign wealth funds. But across the board, they play by
the rules and, as far as international regimes for trade, direct investment and capital
movement are concerned, do not demand a fundamentally different institutional
hardware for the world economy.19
International turbulence and tax policy
As a result of recent international ﬁnancial and economic turbulence, the per-
ceived lack of international tax cooperation has come prominently in the picture.
Independent from the ﬁnancial crisis, in the course of 2007–2008 big interna-
tional tax scandals erupted in connection with the Swiss bank UBS and the
Liechtenstein-based wealth manager LGT. Both were accused of assisting
wealthy citizens from the US, Germany and other countries in hiding taxable
income from their respective tax authorities. The ﬁnancial crisis indirectly added
to the growing awareness about ill-conceived tax policies. First, the loosely
regulated ‘offshore ﬁnancial centres’ or ‘tax havens’ served as an ideal place to
accommodate the structured investment vehicles that were used by international
ﬁnancial institutions to conceal and remove highly complex and risky ﬁnancial
operations and products from their balance-sheets. In this way, tax havens have
contributed to the rise of a ‘shadow banking system’ that was able to disperse
trillions of dollars of toxic products all over the world economy.20 Second, some
governments raised objections about bailing out banks with public money, while
some of those banks were still in the business of helping citizens and companies
to avoid and evade taxes, including through their own branches in tax havens.21
Third, the ﬁnancial crisis has catapulted the old idea of a tax on ﬁnancial
transactions on top of the global international agenda. In the remainder of this
paper we will explore how and to what extent the crisis and the scandals have
impacted upon international tax policy, more precisely with regard to issues such
as cross-border tax evasion, inter-state tax competition and Tobin-like taxes. We
will do so through the lens of ideas, material interests and institutions.
An ideational backlash against socially unfair tax practices in the context of neo-
liberal globalisation (e.g. the use of tax havens, manipulative proﬁt shifting by
multinationals, ﬁerce tax competition between states, lack of information exchange
between jurisdictions) is not entirely new in recent times. In the second half of
the 1990s, both the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of Economic
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Development and Cooperation (OECD) embarked upon a crackdown against a
series of harmful tax practices. This has resulted in the European savings directive
(ensuring effective taxation in the EU upon certain ﬁnancial assets through a system
of information exchange and withholding taxes), EU and OECD codes of conduct
against special corporate tax schemes, a tougher stance on special tax incentives via
the European state aid rules, and an OECD initiative vis-a`-vis tax havens worldwide
to promote more transparency and information exchange upon request.22 The recent
tax scandals and the ﬁnancial crisis have reinvigorated this debate. Western leaders
have adopted more militant language on ‘letting the bankers pay’ and ‘closing down
tax havens’. In this context, the renewed interest for a variant of the Tobin tax should
be noted. The international political support for this idea has reached unprecedented
levels, with Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel at the forefront
of the campaign. Even key players in the ﬁnancial sector, such as Lord Turner,
chairman of the Financial Services Authority in the UK, and – recently and
moderately – Dominique Strauss-Kahn, head of the IMF, have spoken out in
favour of the idea. The US government remains very reluctant, however.23–25
Ideas for internationally concerted taxes on bankers’ bonuses and levies on banks
to ﬁnance bailout funds, are also on the table of international fora.26,27
The current backlash particularly targets the ﬁnancial sector (banks, offshore
ﬁnancial centres, ﬁnancial transactions, etc), but the problem of tax competition
between countries (notably with regard to corporate taxation) remains largely out of
the scope of the international policy debate. It must be said, however, that the new
atmosphere has helped to raise awareness on the link between unsocial tax practices
and development. The premier site for this debate was the UN follow-up conference
on ‘Financing for Development’ in Doha in Fall 2008. The outcome document of
that conference does not contain many palpable references to this issue, but in the
run-up a major breakthrough at the ideational level has been realised thanks to the
Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development (an intergovernmental
group launched by France and Brazil in 2006), governmental ofﬁcials from Norway,
Germany and South Africa, the secretariats of the UN and OECD, and NGOs such
as the Tax Justice Network and Global Financial Integrity, with, in their slipstream,
established NGOs such as Oxfam and ActionAid. Through this movement, for the
ﬁrst time in history, a broad globalisation-related and development-relevant tax
agenda (e.g. taxation of multinationals and extractive industries, capital ﬂight to tax
havens, technical assistance to developing countries on tax, and so on) was brought
to the attention of the international community, with ample resonance in the
international press.28 The following quote from the head of the OECD, Angel
Gurrı´a, gives a good idea of the changed mood:
Tax dodgers in developed and developing countries deprive governments of
revenues. Many take advantage of the lack of transparency in tax havens.
Developing countries are estimated to lose to tax havens almost three times
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what they get from developed countries in aid. If taxes on assets hidden by tax
dodgers were collected in their owners’ jurisdictions, billions of dollars could
become available for ﬁnancing development.29
As far as material interests are concerned, it is obvious that ﬁnancial capital is on the
defensive. By undermining its ideational base, the crisis has seriously harmed its
hegemonic status. The events have empowered other social forces and ideas, which
are now increasingly reﬂected in governmental policies. Bankers and other ﬁnancial
institutions will have to pay, and even more so depending on the success of trans-
national regulatory cooperation – think of a global ﬁnancial transactions tax. Without
any doubt, public regulation of the ﬁnancial sector will be stepped up. But the
fundamental question here is whether, as a direct or indirect result of the crisis, the
most wealthy in society as a whole will have to pay more taxes, in particular by
curbing their possibilities to use and misuse neo-liberal globalisation.
At the national level, several Western countries are tightening their policies vis-a`-
vis tax havens. The British Crown Dependencies Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey,
as well as Overseas Territories such as Bermuda and Cayman Islands have come
under scrutiny by the UK government against the backdrop of rising international
criticism on tax havens, and offshore centres are becoming themselves victims of the
crisis. It is even feared that some Caribbean jurisdictions could become failed
states.30 Following the bailing out of banks, has the time come to bail out tax havens,
after they have been facilitating massive tax evasion for decades? An independent
review report to the British government now recommends that all tax havens sub-
scribe to OECD standards on information exchange, sign information exchange
agreements with the countries they have important ﬁnancial links with, enter into the
EU system of automatic information exchange, and raise their own taxes to save
their treasuries. The report also calls upon the UK to take the lead internationally to
improve OECD standards on the question of identiﬁcation of real ownership (see
below).31 Under pressure from their government, the French banks decided collec-
tively to close their branches and subsidiaries in offshore ﬁnancial centres that do not
meet certain standards on transparency and information exchange.32 In the US, the
‘Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’ is still pending.33 In August 2009, US tax authorities
won a legal battle with the Swiss bank UBS forcing the latter to provide thousands
of American citizens’ account details. This event has further undermined Swiss
banking secrecy and sets a very important precedent that will progressively limit
the possibilities of offshore tax evasion.34 The leakage of account details from the
Liechtenstein-based wealth managing institution LGT and the ﬁrm reaction by
the German and other authorities have also sent a signal to tax dodgers that their
activities have become quite dangerous for themselves. Growing awareness in the
South on the link between proper tax policies and development, including increasing
activity to exchange best practices and expertise among countries, gives hope that in
the coming years more tax revenue will be raised.28
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As for international cooperation in curbing tax evasion, the result thus far is less
convincing, despite all the talk in the run-up to G20 summits on ‘closing down tax
havens’. The G20 has endorsed the OECD standards with regard to exchange of
information. This standard means that jurisdictions fully cooperate with respect to
any foreign demand for information on a particular tax payer, with the exchange
prevailing over domestic banking secrecy or any other domestic regulation. To be
clear, this is about information exchange upon request, in relation to a certain tax
payer, and not automatic information exchange concerning all tax payers, which
would be a much more powerful device to deter offshore tax evasion. At its
April 2009 London summit, the G20 and OECD published a grey list (jurisdictions
that have committed to the standard, but have not yet implemented it) and a black
list (jurisdictions that have not committed to the standard). By signing just
12 agreements with other countries on information exchange, a jurisdiction can
move from the grey list, which is what several countries have done in the course
of 2009. Moreover, at this moment, the G20/OECD black-list is empty, as the
four remaining tax havens have committed to the standard shortly after the
London summit. This renders the G20 threat to apply sanctions against black-list
jurisdictions quite hollow. For example, Liechtenstein (with at the time of writing
only 12 bilateral tax information exchange agreements, including with a number of
other tax havens) is now on the ‘white’ list of ‘jurisdictions that have substantially
implemented the internationally agreed tax standard’.35 Recent comments from
OECD ofﬁcials have indicated, though, that the criteria could be tightened in the
future.36 Another problem is that, despite the OECD standards, the real ownership
of certain ﬁnancial vehicles in tax havens can still be concealed, which causes
considerable leakage (Ref. 31, p. 61).
Above, we pointed out that new constitutionalism as the institutional pillar of
neo-liberal globalisation provides the latter with resilience. This can be illustrated
with the example of tax policy as well. First of all, the ﬁnancial crisis has not put
into question globalisation itself, more precisely the current level of free movement
of capital, goods and services. Governments have not announced to collectively
roll-back globalisation by reinstalling capital controls or huge trade and investment
barriers. Note that a real Tobin tax, as James Tobin himself proposed it – i.e. a
tax of about 0.1% or more on international currency transactions as a means to
discourage international ﬁnancial speculation and preventively stabilise ﬁnancial
markets – would have the effect of slowing down international capital movements
and thus contributing to ‘de-globalisation’. But the kind of ﬁnancial transaction
taxes that are now on the table are of a completely different type. First, the rate
would be much lower, so that ﬁnancial markets would only be lightly affected
(0.005% is an often cited rate – Ref. 25). Second, in most proposals the purpose
of the tax would not be to slow down international ﬁnancial transactions, but
mainly to ﬁnance the costs of the ﬁnancial crisis, development or climate policies.
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Third, under some of the most important proposals, various ﬁnancial transactions
would be targeted (including sale of shares), and not only cross-border movements.
In the absence of de-globalisation proposals, the only way to compensate the
political-geographical mismatch between ﬁnancial and economic mobility on the
one hand and political regulation on the other, is to introduce global forms of
regulation that create a level playing ﬁeld. As we have seen, this is basically the
path politicians have attempted to follow over the last few years. Free movement
within an integrated economic space has remained more or less intact, but
governments have tried to build international frameworks in which the ‘race to
the bottom’ of effective tax rates is stopped (e.g., EU and OECD codes of
conducts against special tax schemes for corporations) or national policies can
be enforced extraterritorially (e.g., EU and OECD standards with regard to
exchange of information). But at the same time, we see that these frameworks are
relatively weak. This kind of ‘horizontal’ regulation faces tremendous collective
action problems. A number of jurisdictions do not want to strengthen interna-
tional tax cooperation, and can to some extent determine the pace of international
decision-making and even block certain efforts. For example, the US is still
opposed to a global transaction tax, while the proponents are lukewarm to
introduce it unilaterally. The EU savings directive still contains several loopholes
(a series of ﬁnancial products and vehicles are exempted), but countries such as
the UK and Luxembourg are reluctant to expand its scope. Their positions are
crucial, since in the EU, as a feature of today’s new constitutionalism, unanimity
voting applies for all tax matters. The deepening of multipolarity and the evo-
lution to a ‘post-Western’ world are not a blessing either in this respect. Russia
and some Gulf states display features of a tax haven and are not renowned for
strict ﬁnancial regulation. China has been reported to protect tax havens like
Hong Kong and Macau during G20 negotiations (Ref. 37). The new con-
stitutionalist context continues to enable the authorities of certain jurisdictions,
aligned with particular material interests, to act as de facto veto players.
Conclusion
To summarise, the crisis has to some extent shaken the foundations of neo-liberal
hegemony, in particular at the ideational level. But it is absolutely premature to
announce the end of neo-liberal globalisation. Neo-liberal hegemony has only
partially been de-legitimised. The free movement of capital and goods remains
untouched. One of the reasons is that neo-liberalism itself and the ensuing
weakness of ﬁnancial regulation have been blamed for the subprime crisis, but
not ﬁnancial and economic globalisation as such, which in its current form is
equally a product of neo-liberalism. This state of affairs allows the political-
geographical mismatch between private economic activity and public regulation
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to persist. Economic and new constitutionalist, legal anchoring of neo-liberal
globalisation remain in place, while global, horizontal regulation directed at a
level playing ﬁeld is severely hampered by collective action problems, in favour
of certain material interests at the core of neo-liberal hegemony.
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